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ABSTRACT 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been 
extensively used by wind turbine assembly manufacturers 
for risk and reliability analysis. However, several limitations 
are associated with its implementation in offshore wind 
farms: (i) the failure data gathered from SCADA system is 
often missing or unreliable, and hence, the assessment 
information of the three risk factors (i.e., severity, 
occurrence, and fault detection) are mainly based on 
experts’ knowledge; (ii) it is rather difficult for experts to 
precisely evaluate the risk factors; (iii) the relative 
importance among the risk factors is not taken into 
consideration, and hence, the results may not necessarily 
represent the true risk priorities; and etc. To overcome these 
drawbacks and improve the effectiveness of the traditional 
FMEA, we develop a fuzzy-FMEA approach for risk and 
failure mode analysis in offshore wind turbine systems. The 
information obtained from the experts is expressed using 
fuzzy linguistics terms, and a grey theory analysis is 
proposed to incorporate the relative importance of the risk 
factors into the determination of risk priority of failure 
modes. The proposed approach is applied to an offshore 
wind turbine system with sixteen mechanical, electrical and 
auxiliary assemblies, and the results are compared with the 
traditional FMEA. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Offshore wind energy has experienced an extensive and 
worldwide growth during the past several years. For 
instance, of the 9,616 MW installed wind energy capacity in 
the EU in 2011, 866 MW (i.e., 9%) was offshore, which 
increased the EU’s offshore wind power capacity to 3,810 
MW—less than one percent of the total electricity demand 
(EWEA, 2012). Certain forecasts indicate that the share of 
offshore wind power in EU’s electricity demand will reach 
up to 14% by 2030. 
Comparing with onshore wind power, offshore winds tend 
to flow at higher speeds, thus it allows turbines to produce 
more electricity (Bilgili, Yasar and Simsek, 2011). 
However, a wind power system located on sea comes with 
higher failure rate, lower reliability, and higher operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs. So, with the development of 
wind farms in remote areas, the need for efficient tool to 
identify and then limit or avoid risk of failures is of 
increasing importance. 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been 
extensively used by wind turbine assembly manufacturers 
for analyzing, evaluating, and prioritizing the potential 
failure modes (Andrawus, 2008). FMEA is a structured, 
bottom-up approach that starts with potential/known failure 
modes at one level and investigates the effect on the next 
sub-system level (Kumar and Kumar, 2005). Hence, a 
complete FMEA analysis of a system often spans all the 
levels in the hierarchy from bottom to top (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1– Hierarchical structure of a typical wind turbine system. 
A failure mode is defined as the way in which a component, 
subsystem or system could potentially fail to perform its 
desired function. Examples of failure modes in wind turbine 
systems are: material fatigue, deterioration, deformation, 
strips, fracture, detachment, blockage, misalignment, 
collapse, and etc. (Tavner, Xiang and Spinato, 2007).  
_____________________ 
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A failure cause is defined as a weakness that may result in a 
failure. Typical causes of failures in wind turbine systems 
are: using incorrect material, poor welding, corrosion, 
assembly error, calibration error, over stressing, 
overheating, icing, maintenance fault, forming of cracks, 
being out of balance, connection failure, and etc. 
The failure modes are usually detected through visual 
inspection, online condition monitoring techniques – such as 
oil analysis and ultrasonic testing (for more see Márquez, 
Tobias, Pérez and Papaelias, 2012), and time-based 
preventive maintenance actions. For each identified failure 
mode, their ultimate effects need to be determined by a 
cross-functional team which is usually formed by specialists 
from various functions (e.g., design, operation and 
maintenance, and power production). A failure effect is 
defined as the result of a failure mode on the function of the 
system as perceived by the user. Some of the effects of a 
failure in wind turbine systems are loss of electricity 
production, poor power quality to the grid, and a significant 
audible noise. Also, the effects of a failure in one 
component can be the cause of a failure mode in another 
component. 
As outlined by Pillay and Wang (2003), the process for 
carrying out an FMEA can be divided into several steps as 
shown in Fig. 2.  
 
Fig 2– FMEA process. 
Basically, each failure mode in the FMEA technique is 
evaluated by three factors as severity (S), likelihood of 
occurrence (O), and the difficulty of detection (D). A 
number between 1 and 10 (with 1 being the best and 10 
being the worst case) is given for each of the three factors, 
and a risk-priority-number (RPN) is obtained, which is RPN 
= SOD. The RPN value helps the FMEA team to 
identify the components or subsystems that need the priority 
actions for improvement. Depending on the wind farm 
manager’s decision, different criteria are used to trigger the 
improvement actions. For instance, action could be required 
if the overall RPN exceeds a predefined threshold, or for the 
highest RPN regardless of a threshold. Finally, at the last 
step, some hardware, software or design modifications are 
made in the system to minimize the failure effects. 
Even though FMEA is probably the most popular tool for 
reliability and failure mode analysis in wind turbine 
systems, several limitations are associated with its 
implementation in offshore wind farms: 
(i) The failure data gathered from inspectors, vibration 
sensors, and the SCADA system is often missing or 
unreliable. Hence, the assessment information of three 
risk factors (severity, occurrence, and detection) is 
mainly based on experts’ knowledge and expertise; 
(ii) Comparing with onshore wind power, the history of 
offshore wind power generation is fairly recent. Hence, 
it is difficult or even impossible for experts to 
precisely evaluate the three risk factors S, O and D. 
The risk factors are often expressed in a linguistic way 
(such as ‘likely’ , ‘important’, ‘very high’ and etc); 
(iii) In the traditional FMEA methodology, the three risk 
factors are assumed to have the same importance 
(Braglia, 2000). However, it is observed that many 
O&M experts give more preference to the ‘fault 
detection’ factor. 
So, the results of the traditional FMEA methodology may 
not necessarily represent the true risk priorities in offshore 
wind turbine systems, and this can entail a waste of 
resources and time. 
To overcome the above drawbacks and improve the 
effectiveness of the traditional FMEA methodology, we 
develop a fuzzy-FMEA approach to determine the effects of 
failure on offshore wind turbine systems. Firstly, a fuzzy 
inference approach is considered to represent the assessment 
information using linguistic terms. Then, by using the 
weight vector of three risk factors, a grey theory analysis is 
proposed to rank the failure modes. To our knowledge, this 
paper is the first attempt to make the traditional FMEA 
methodology more applicable for offshore wind turbine 
systems, especially when the failure data is unavailable or 
unreliable. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
we give a brief overview of FMEA methodology so as to set 
the background for the main contribution of the paper. 
Section 3 describes the wind turbine system considered in 
this paper. In section 4, the proposed fuzzy approach which 
utilizes the fuzzy IF–THEN rules and grey relation analysis. 
Finally, in section 5, the results obtained from the proposed 
approach are compared with the traditional FMEA. 
2. FMEA: AN OVERVIEW  
FMEA as a formal system analysis methodology was first 
proposed by NASA in 1963 for their obvious reliability 
requirements. Then, it was adopted and implemented by 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT 
3 
Ford Motor in 1977 (Gilchrist, 1993). Since then, it has 
become a powerful tool extensively used for risk and 
reliability analysis of systems in a wide range of industries, 
including automotive, construction, aerospace, nuclear, and 
electro-technical. 
2.1. FMEA in Wind Turbines 
A brief review of the literature shows that only a few 
researchers have worked on improving the traditional 
FMEA methodology to make it more practical for wind 
turbine systems. Arabian-Hoseynabadi, Oraee and Tavner 
(2010) presented a design-stage FMEA methodology for 
prioritization of failures in a 2-MW wind turbine system 
(named as R80) within the RELIAWIND project. The 
authors’ methodology used four-point scales for severity 
rating (Table 1), occurrence rating (Table 2), and detection 
of a failure (Table 3) to represent the risk of the 64 possible 
severity–occurrence–detection combinations. 
Table 1– Severity rating scale for wind turbine FMEA. 
Scale 
# 
Description Criteria 
1 Category IV 
(minor) 
Electricity can be generated but urgent 
repair is required. 
2 Category III 
(marginal) 
Reduction in ability to generate 
electricity. 
3 Category II 
(critical) 
Loss of ability to generate electricity. 
4 Category I 
(catastrophic) 
Major damage to the Turbine as a 
capital installation. 
Table 2– Occurrence rating scale for wind turbine FMEA. 
Scale 
# 
Description Criteria 
1 Level E 
(extremely 
unlikely) 
A single failure mode probability of 
occurrence is less than 0.001. 
2 Level D 
(remote) 
A single failure mode probability of 
occurrence is more than 0.001 but 
less than 0.01. 
3 Level C 
(occasional) 
A single failure mode probability of 
occurrence is more than 0.01 but 
less than 0.10. 
5 Level A 
(frequent) 
A single failure mode probability of 
occurrence is greater than 0.10. 
Table 3– Detection rating scale for wind turbine FMEA. 
Scale 
# 
Description Criteria 
1 Almost 
certain  
Current monitoring methods almost 
always will defect the failure. 
4 High  Good likelihood current monitoring 
methods will detect the failure.  
7  Low  Low likelihood current monitoring 
methods will defect the failure. 
10 Almost 
impossible 
No known monitoring methods 
available to detect the failure. 
From the scales that they assign to the three risk factors, the 
following results can be concluded:  
(i) The proposed methodology gives importance weights of 
(0.21, 0.26, 0.53) to (S, O, D). This implies that their 
methodology gives more preference to the fault 
detection factor. 
(ii) From the existing sixty-four combinations, only thirty-
nine different RPN values can be obtained, which they 
are heavily distributed at the bottom of the scale from 1 
to 100 (see Fig. 3).  
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Fig 3–The RPN values for the sixty-four ‘occurrence–severity–detection’ 
combinations 
Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor (2011) proposed a cost-priority-
number (CPN) approach, in which the system’s risk is 
calculated as CPN, where C is the cost consequences of 
each failure, P is the probability of occurrence, and N is the 
possibility of not detection. This approach has been recently 
extended in Dinmohammadi and Shafiee (2013) by 
incorporating all the costs associated with each failure 
(corrective replacement, spare parts, transportation, 
manpower, and production loss) in calculating the CPN 
value. Also, a quantitative study is carried out on two the 
same type of onshore and offshore wind turbines, and some 
useful comparisons are made. 
2.2. Fuzzy FMEA 
Fuzzy logic is a tool for transforming the vagueness of 
human feeling and recognition into a mathematical formula. 
It also provides meaningful representation of measurement 
for uncertainties and vague concepts expressed in natural 
language. In line with this, there has been a growing trend in 
FMEA literature to use fuzzy linguistic terms for describing 
the three risk factors S, O, and D. Readers can refer to 
Yang, Bonsall, and Wang (2008); Keskin and Özkan 
(2009); Gargama and Chaturvedi (2011) as good sources of 
fuzzy-FMEA approach. Most of the existing studies in the 
fuzzy FMEA literature have concerned with the fuzzy rule-
base approach by using ‘If–Then’ rules. Fig. 4 shows an 
overall view of the fuzzy rule base technique, in which there 
are three major steps to carry out the assessment (Chin, 
Chan and Yang, 2008):  
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(i) Fuzzification process uses linguistic variables to convert 
the three risk factors S, O and D into the fuzzy 
representations. Using the linguistic variables and their 
definitions, ranking three risk factors can be made in a 
scale basis. These inputs are then fuzzified to determine 
the degree of membership in each input class.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4–Overall view of the fuzzy-FMEA approach 
(ii) Rule evaluation consists of the expert knowledge about 
the interactions between various failure modes and effect 
that is represented in the form of fuzzy if–then rules. 
Such rules are usually more conveniently formulated in 
linguistic terms than in numerical terms. The outputs of 
the fuzzy inference system are variously named as 
‘riskiness’, ‘critically failure mode’, ‘priority for 
attention’, and ‘fuzzy RPN’ in the fuzzy FMEA studies.   
(iii) Defuzzification process creates a crisp ranking from the 
fuzzy RPN to give the prioritization level for the failure 
modes. 
3. WIND TURBINE SYSTEM CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY  
Nowadays, many kinds of wind turbine systems compete in 
the market. According to Li and Chen (2008), wind turbines 
can be categorized by their generator, gearbox, and their 
power converter types. 
Fixed speed wind turbines which operate with constant 
speed ‘Danish concept’ were produced until the late 1990s 
with the power ratings below 1-MW. They used a multi-
stage gearbox, and a standard squirrel-cage induction 
generator directly connected to the grid through a 
transformer. From the late 1990s, fully variable speed wind 
turbines were introduced in wind power industry. The first 
generation of fully variable speed wind turbines (with power 
ratings approximately 1-MW) used a multi-stage gearbox, a 
relatively low-cost standard wound rotor induction 
generator, and a power electronic converter feeding the rotor 
(Carlin, Laxson and Muljadi, 2003). The doubly fed 
induction generator (DFIG) technology is currently the most 
widely used in the wind turbine industry because of its low 
investment cost and good energy yield (Muller, Deicke and 
De Doncker, 2002). Since 1991, there have also been 
variable speed wind turbines with gearless generator 
systems which are equipped with a direct-drive generator 
and a fully-rated power electronic converter. The brushless 
doubly fed induction generator (BDFIG) is a well known 
drive technology which eliminates the need for brushes and 
slip rings, increases the lifetime of the machine, and 
ultimately reduces the maintenance costs (Carlson, 
Voltolini, Runcos and Kuo-Peng, 2006). 
This paper focuses on a 5-MW REpower MM92 wind 
turbine system (Fig. 5), which is available in both onshore 
and offshore types. This wind turbine system features a non-
integrated drive train with a rotor shaft supported by two 
bearings, a combined planetary/spur wheel gearbox, and a 
double-fed asynchronous generator. The three-blade rotor 
with a diameter of 126 meters is also equipped with an 
electrical blade angle adjustment and a cast iron rotor hub. 
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Fig. 5– 5MW REpower MM92 wind turbine system (http://www.REpower.de/) 
After recognizing the wind turbine type, we define a general 
set of the sub-assemblies and main parts. In this study, 
sixteen sub-assemblies and components with higher failure 
probabilities and serious consequences have been 
considered as presented in Table 4. It may be apparent that 
not all of these components may be available in some types 
of wind turbine systems. 
 Table 4– The sixteen sub-assemblies considered in this study (listed in 
alphabetical order). 
ID Sub-assemblies Some components 
1 Brake system Brake disk, Spring, Motor 
2 Cables  
3 Gearbox Toothed gear wheels, Pump, Oil 
heater/cooler, Hoses 
4 Generator Shaft, Bearings, Rotor, Stator, Coil 
5 Main frame  
6 Main shaft Shaft, Bearings, Couplings 
7 Nacelle 
housing 
Nacelle 
8 Pitch system Pitch motor, Gears 
9 Power 
converter 
Power electronic switch, cable, DC bus 
10 Rotor bearings  
11 Rotor blades Blades 
12 Rotor hub Hub, Air brake 
13 Screws  
14 Tower Tower, Foundation 
15 Transformer Controllers 
16 Yaw system Yaw drive, Yaw motor 
After subdivision of the wind turbine system, the potential 
failure modes of the sub-assemblies are identified using the 
information gathered from four experts. These experts have 
experience within the reliability, availability, maintainability 
and safety (RAMS) of the wind energy industry, ranging 
from three to six years. The experts used the ‘fault tree 
analysis (FTA)’ to describe the complete set of potential 
system failures (for more see Andrews and Moss, 1993). 
The FTA is one of the most popular and diagrammatic 
techniques to analyze the undesired states of a system that 
uses AND gate (the output occurs only if all inputs occur) 
and OR gate (the output occurs if any input occurs). Fig. 6 
depicts the fault tree diagram for two important sub-
assemblies of the wind turbine system: generator and tower. 
4. PROPOSED FUZZY-FMEA APPROACH  
In this section, a new proposed approach which utilizes the 
fuzzy IF–THEN rules and grey relation theory is presented. 
The linguistic terms describing the ‘inputs’ are Remote (R), 
Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) and Very High (VH), and 
for ‘output’ are Unnecessary (U), minor (mi), very-low (vl), 
low (l), moderate (mod), high (h), Moderate-high (Mh), 
Very-high (Vh), necessary (n) and Absolutely-necessary (A-
n). 
By using the interpretations of the linguistic terms described 
in Table 5, the experts were requested to define the 
membership functions. After receiving the feedback from 
the experts, the membership function of the linguistic terms 
defined by triangular fuzzy number (a,b,c) expressing the 
proposition ‘close to b’. Making use of the fuzzy logic 
toolbox simulator of MATLAB®, the membership functions 
for the linguistic variables of severity, occurrence, detection, 
and fuzzy RPN are graphically represented in Fig. 7. 
 
 (a) 
 
(b)  
Fig. 6– Fault tree diagram for (a) #4: Generator (b) #14: Tower. 
Table 5– Interpretations of the linguistic terms for developing the fuzzy 
rule system (Guimarães and Lapa, 2007). 
Linguistic 
term 
Probability of 
occurrence 
Severity Detection 
Remote It would be very 
unlikely for 
these failures to 
be observed 
even once 
A failure that has no 
effect on the system 
performance, the 
operator probably will 
not notice 
Defect remains 
undetected until 
the system 
performance 
degrades to the 
extent that the task 
will not be 
completed 
Low Likely to occur 
once, but 
unlikely 
to occur more 
frequently 
A failure that would 
cause slight annoyance 
to the operator, but 
that cause no 
deterioration to the 
system 
Defect remains 
undetected until 
system 
performance is 
severely reduced 
Moderate Likely to occur 
more than once 
A failure that would 
cause a high degree of 
operator dissatisfaction 
or that causes 
noticeable but slight 
deterioration in system 
performance 
Defect remains 
undetected until 
system 
performance is 
affected 
High Near certain to 
occur at least 
once 
A failure that causes 
significant 
deterioration in system 
performance and/or 
Defect remains 
undetected until 
inspection or test 
is carried out 
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leads to minor injuries 
Very high Near certain to 
occur several 
times 
A failure that would 
seriously affect the 
ability to complete The 
task or cause damage, 
serious injury or death 
Failure remains 
undetected, such a 
defect would 
almost certainly be 
detected during 
inspection or test 
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(b)  
Fig. 7– Membership functions for (a) severity, occurrence, and detection, 
and (b) riskiness. 
4.1. Fuzzy Rule Base 
The membership functions derived from the experts are 
used to generate the fuzzy rule base. A total of 555 = 
125 rules are generated. However, these rules are combined 
(where possible) and the total number of rules in the fuzzy 
rule base is reduced to 35 rules. The Rule Viewer of the 
MATLAB that opens during the simulation can be used to 
access the ‘Membership Function Editor’ and the ‘Rule 
Editor’. Through ‘Simulator’ many results can be evaluated 
and rules can be removed. For example, consider these three 
rules:  
Rule 1: if Severity is H, Occurrence is M, and Detection 
is M, then Riskiness is M–h. 
Rule 2: if Severity is M, Occurrence is H, and Detection 
is H, then Riskiness is M–h. 
Rule 3: if Severity is H, Occurrence is H, and Detection 
is M, then Riskiness is M–h. 
Rules 1, 2 and 3, can be combined to produce: ‘‘if Severity 
is H, Occurrence is M, and Detection is M, then Riskiness is 
M–h’’ or any combination of the three linguistic terms 
assigned to these variables, then Riskiness is M–h. 
The results of the fuzzy rule base are then defuzzified using 
the centroid method (see Cheng, 1998) to obtain the crisp 
value of ‘riskiness’ for ranking the failure modes. The 
defuzzified crisp numbers of ten output linguistic terms are 
given in Table 6. 
Table 6–The defuzzified crisp numbers of output linguistic terms 
U mi vl l Mod h M-h V-h n A-n 
0.81 2.03 3.02 4.01 5.01 6.01 7.01 8.01 9.01 9.67 
Fuzzy inference functions used in this application are: 
name: ‘FMEA_WT’ 
type: ‘Mamdani’ 
andMethod: ‘min’ 
orMethod: ‘max’ 
defuzzMethod: ‘centroid’ 
impMethod: ‘min’ 
aggMethod: ‘max’ 
4.2. Grey Relational Analysis  
In the proposed rule base reduction, the three risk factors S, 
O and D are assumed to have the same importance. To 
assign different weights to the three risk factors, grey theory 
approach is suggested within the FMEA framework. Grey 
theory was first proposed and developed by Deng (1989) to 
deal with making decisions characterized by incomplete 
information. Indeed, it provides a measure to analyze 
relationship between discrete quantitative and qualitative 
series. The process for carrying out a grey relation analysis 
in FMEA involves several steps as shown in Fig. 8 (Liu, 
Liu, Bian, Lin, Dong and Xu, 2011). 
 
Fig 8–Grey relation analysis in FMEA 
(i) Express S, O and D by linguistic terms and the 
membership functions as shown in Fig. 7(a). 
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(ii) Defuzzify S, O and D using Chen and Klien’s method 
(1997) for obtaining the crisp number of a fuzzy set as 
shown in Eq. (1). 
As an example, consider the defuzzification of the linguistic 
term Low in Fig. 9. This linguistic term can be defuzzified 
to 
 

 




n
i
n
i
ii
n
i
i
dacb
cb
xK
0 0
0
)()(
)(
)(
,                     (1) 
0.370
10]}[3.510]{[20]}[3.50]{[5
0][3.50][5


  
 
Fig. 9– Defuzzification of the linguistic term Low 
The defuzzified crisp numbers of five linguistic terms 
are given in Table 7. 
Table 7. The defuzzified crisp numbers of input linguistic terms 
R L M H VH 
0.196 0.370 0.583 0.804 0.952 
(iii) Establish comparative series, which reflects the various 
linguistic terms and decision factors of the study. This 
can be represented in the form of a matrix, X as 















321
3
2
2
2
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
nnn xxx
xxx
xxx
X
......
,                          (2) 
where n is the number of the failure modes, 1
ix , 
2
ix  and 
3
ix  are the crisp numbers of three risk factors for i
th
 
failure mode. For example, for sub-assembly 6 (main 
shaft), 1
6x , 
2
6x  and 
3
6x  are assigned, respectively, 0.370, 
0.370 and 0.583.  
(iv) Establish standard series, which reflects the ideal or 
desired level of all the decision factors. This can be 
represented in a form of a matrix, Y as 















321
3
2
2
2
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
nnn yyy
yyy
yyy
Y
......
,                             (3) 
where 1
iy , 
2
iy  and 
3
iy  represent the crisp numbers of the 
lowest level of three risk factors for i
th
 failure modes. 
Here, we have 0.196jiy , for any 
}{1,2,..., ni and {1,2,3}j .  
(v) Calculate the difference between the comparative series 
and standard series. This can be represented in a form of 
a matrix, D , as 















321
3
2
2
2
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
nnn ddd
ddd
ddd
D
......
,                            (4) 
where j
i
j
i
j
i yxd  , for any 
}{1,2,..., ni and {1,2,3}j . 
(vi) Compute the grey relation coefficient using the 
following equation (Chang, Wei and Lee, 1999): 
max
maxmin
Dd
DD
j
i
j
i





 ,                           (5) 
where minmin
min ji
D  j
id , maxmaxmax ji
D  j
id , and 
[0,1] is an identifier which only affects the relative 
value of risk without any change in priority. Here, we 
have 0min D , 756.0max D , and   is assumed to be 
0.5. 
(vii) Introduce the weight vector of three risk factors 
( ,1 2 , 3 ), where 1,,0 321   , and 
1321    . Weight vector of risk factors can be 
obtained by either directly assigning or indirectly using 
pair-wise comparisons (Kutlu and Ekmekçioğlu, 
2012). Here, we consider the weights vector as in 
Arabian-Hoseynabadi, Oraee and Tavner (2010), i.e.,  
(0.21, 0.26, 0.53) for (S, O, D).  
(viii) Determine the degree of relation using 
3
3
2
2
1
1 iiii    for each failure mode 
incorporating the weighted variables. 
(i) Rank the priority of risk: the stronger the degree of 
relation, the smaller is the effect of the cause. 
5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS  
In this Section, a comparative study is carried out using the 
traditional and the proposed fuzzy-FMEA methodologies 
applied to an offshore wind turbine system. The same 
experts have been surveyed for two methodologies to enable 
comparisons of the results. Our field failure data has been 
collected from 10-minute SCADA database, automated fault 
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logs, operation and maintenance reports. Fig. 10 represents 
the failure rate of the sixteen sub-assemblies of the offshore 
wind turbine, where the average failure rate of the system 
(i.e., the expected number of failures per year) is equal to 
1.38/year. 
 
Fig. 10–The failure rates of the sub-assemblies of the offshore wind turbine 
system (sub-assemblies are listed in alphabetical order). 
As shown, the gearbox, rotor blades, generator, tower and 
the transformer have the highest failure rates. 
5.1. Traditional FMEA 
On the basis of real data collected from an offshore wind 
farm database, and the criteria explained in tables 1–3, the 
traditional FMEA methodology is applied to the offshore 
wind turbine system. Table 8 gives the RPN values for the 
sixteen wind turbine sub-assemblies that considered in this 
study. 
Table 8– The RPN values for wind turbine sub-assemblies 
ID Sub-assemblies S O D RPN Rank 
1 Brake system 2 2 7 28 11 
2 Cables 3 2 1 6 14 
3 Gearbox 3 5 7 105 2 
4 Generator 2 5 7 70 5 
5 Main frame 4 2 4 32 10 
6 Main shaft 2 3 7 42 8 
7 Nacelle 
housing 
3 2 1 6 14 
8 Pitch system 4 2 7 56 7 
9 Power 
converter 
4 3 7 84 4 
10 Rotor bearings 3 2 4 24 12 
11 Rotor blades 3 5 7 105 2 
12 Rotor hub 2 5 4 40 9 
13 Screws 1 2 1 2 16 
14 Tower 4 5 7 140 1 
15 Transformer 3 5 4 60 6 
16 Yaw system 2 2 4 16 13 
The results show that the tower (sub-assembly #14) is the 
most critical and the screws (sub-assembly #13) are the least 
critical parts in the offshore wind turbine system with the 
RPN values of 140 and 2, respectively. 
From Table 8, the values of S, O and D for both the sub-
assemblies of gearbox (sub-assembly #3) and rotor blades 
(sub-assembly #11) are the same. Hence, the traditional 
method puts the gearbox and rotor blades as having the 
same priority in offshore wind turbine systems. However, 
all the four experts believe that the hidden risk implications 
of these two failure modes are different in practice. One 
reason for this event is the existing limited number of the 
severity–occurrence–detection combinations for assigning 
to the three risk factors. This difference is obvious when the 
fuzzy rule base method and grey theory is applied. 
5.2. Fuzzy FMEA  
The results obtained from the proposed fuzzy approach are 
presented in Table 9. 
Table 9– Ranking for proposed approach 
ID Sub-assemblies Fuzzy 
rule base 
Grey 
theory  
Ranking 
 (Fuzzy 
rule base) 
Ranking 
(grey 
theory) 
1 Brake system 1.405 0.937 11 12 
2 Cables 1.288 0.941 16 16 
3 Gearbox 4.873 0.829 3 3 
4 Generator 2.032 0.917 6 6 
5 Main frame 1.840 0.923 7 7 
6 Main shaft 1.492 0.932 9 9 
7 Nacelle 
housing 
1.396 0.936 12 11 
8 Pitch system 1.798 0.925 8 8 
9 Power 
converter 
2.503 0.902 4 4 
10 Rotor 
bearings 
1.366 0.939 14 14 
11 Rotor blades 7.660 0.739 2 2 
12 Rotor hub 1.492 0.935 9 10 
13 Screws 1.312 0.940 15 15 
14 Tower 8.890 0.700 1 1 
15 Transformer 2.077 0.916 5 5 
16 Yaw system 1.375 0.938 13 13 
Table 9 shows a noticeable similarity between the results 
obtained from the two ‘fuzzy rule base’ and ‘grey theory’ 
methods. For instance, both approaches are in agreement 
about the tower (sub-assembly #14) being the most critical, 
and the cables (sub-assembly #2) being the least critical 
parts of the offshore wind turbine system. Also, the ranking 
order of the rotor blades (sub-assembly #11) is obtained 
higher than the gearbox (sub-assembly #3) in both the 
methods. The main reason for this event is that the blades 
are ‘stressed’ in a harsh maritime environment and extreme 
weather conditions, and they suffer from different types of 
external damages (including seasonal affects such as icing 
and thunderstorms) (Shafiee, Patriksson and Strömberg, 
2013). 
It should be noted that the ranking order produced by the 
fuzzy rule base method does not differentiate failure modes 
that have the same combination of linguistic terms 
describing the three risk factors. For example, S, O and D 
for the main shaft (sub-assembly #6) and rotor hub (sub-
assembly #12) are assigned, respectively, as 
‘low/low/moderate’ and ‘low/moderate/low’. Hence, the 
defuzzified ranking is obtained the same for these sub-
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assemblies. This entails that the main shaft and rotor hub 
should be given the same priority for attention, and it could 
be misleading. The effects of the weighting coefficient 
introduced in the grey theory method can be clearly seen in 
this case. When using the grey theory method, the grey 
relation ranking is 0.932 and 0.935 for the main shaft and 
rotor hub, respectively. This entails that the main shaft 
should be given a higher priority compared to the rotor hub.  
5.3. Comparison 
In this section, a comparison is made between the ranking 
orders of the traditional FMEA, fuzzy rule base and grey 
theory approaches. In Table 10, the results obtained for the 
offshore wind turbine system from the traditional FMEA 
using the RPN method is compared with the results obtained 
from the proposed fuzzy FMEA using the rule base and grey 
relation methods.  
Table 10–Ranking comparisons between the traditional and the fuzzy-
FMEA approaches 
Rank Traditional Fuzzy rule base Grey theory 
1 Tower Tower Tower 
2 Gearbox / Rotor 
blades 
Rotor blades Rotor blades 
3  Gearbox Gearbox 
4 Power converter Power converter Power converter 
5 Generator Transformer Transformer 
6 Transformer Generator Generator 
7 Pitch system Main frame Main frame 
8 Main shaft Pitch system Pitch system 
9 Rotor hub Main shaft/ Rotor hub Main shaft 
10 Main frame  Rotor hub 
11 Brake system Brake system  Nacelle housing 
12 Rotor bearings Nacelle housing Brake system 
13 Yaw system Yaw system Yaw system 
14 Nacelle housing / 
Cables 
Rotor bearings Rotor bearings 
15  Screws Screws 
16 Screws Cables Cables 
As can be seen, the main problem in the traditional FMEA 
methodology is that it puts two critical sub-assemblies of 
the gearbox and the rotor blades as having the same priority. 
The nacelle housing and the cables are also placed at the 
same ranking level. But, applying the proposed 
methodology reveals that there is a noticeable difference 
between their ranking orders. 
On the other side, there is some noticeable difference 
between the ranking orders of some sub-assemblies (such as 
main frame and nacelle housing) using the traditional and 
the Fuzzy FMEA methods. This shows that a more accurate 
ranking can be achieved by the application of the fuzzy rule 
base and grey theory to FMEA. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH   
The advantages of the proposed fuzzy rule base and grey 
theory approach for application to FMEA of offshore wind 
turbine systems can be summarized as follows: 
a. The proposed fuzzy-FMEA approach provides an 
organized framework to combine the qualitative (expert 
experience) and quantitative (SCADA field data) 
knowledge for use in an FMEA study; 
b. The proposed fuzzy-FMEA approach can be useful 
when the failure data is unavailable or unreliable; 
c. The use of linguistic terms in the analysis enables the 
experts to express their judgments more realistically and 
hence improving the applicability of the FMEA 
technique in offshore wind farms; 
d. The relative importance weights of risk factors are taken 
into consideration in the process of prioritization of 
failure modes, which makes the proposed FMEA more 
realistic, more practical and more flexible. 
The proposed fuzzy rule base method (without the 
weighting vector of the risk factors) could be suitable for 
use in ‘risk screening’ phase, or during the ‘design’ stage of 
a new wind turbine configuration. During the risk-screening 
phase, only a relative ranking order is needed. This will 
distinguish the failure modes with a high risk level from 
those with a low-risk level. The proposed grey theory 
approach (with the weighting vector of the risk factors) 
would be suitable for use in ‘risk analysis and evaluation’ 
phase, or during the ‘operation’ stage. At this stage, a more 
detailed analysis of each failure mode is required to produce 
a ranking order that would determine the allocation of the 
limited resources. As the proposed method provides the 
analyst with the flexibility to decide which factor is more 
important to the analysis, the outcome of the analysis will 
provide valuable information for the wind farm managers or 
the wind turbine manufacturers. 
Still, there is a wide scope for future research in improving 
the traditional FMEA methodology to make it more 
practical for wind turbine systems. Some of the possible 
extensions are: 
(a) The proposed fuzzy-FMEA approach in this paper has 
no limitation on the number of risk factors and can be 
applied to any number of risk factors. 
(b) Sometimes, it is observed that the FMEA team 
members, because of their different expertise and 
backgrounds have different opinions. The diversity and 
uncertainty of FMEA team members’ assessment 
information will be considered in our future research.  
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